Calling upon both positive and normative economics, we attempt to characterize the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change. We begin (section 2) by reviewing the main features of the Protocol.
Introduction: Cooperation at the world level, from Rio to Kyoto
Our central theme in this paper is the one of cooperation at the world level on the issue of climatic change. We start from the facts and then try to enlighten them by means of ideas provided by economics and game theory.
The negotiations on climate change that have been taking place since the late 1980's within the United Nations institutions 6 are obviously a quasiworldwide process, judging by the length of the list of countries 7 participating. But these negotiations, prior to the Kyoto meeting, had led only to a "framework convention", signed in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, that was little more than a declaration of intentions. The real issue was then: are the continuing negotiations eventually going to lead to a sustainable agreement bearing on effective actions that is also worldwide? Or will they lead to a breaking up of the countries into separate blocks, each acting to the best of its own interests?
The Kyoto Protocol, signed in December 1997, is the major development in the post-Rio evolution of these negotiations. Its importance lies mainly in the fact that it bears on effective actions to be taken by countries, actions that are recognized as binding commitments by them.
However, according to the Protocol, not all countries have to take specific actions. As our summary presentation will report more in detail below, commitments to quantified emissions reduction or limitation are mentioned only for the so-called "Annex 1" parties 8 . The rôle of the other countries in the agreement, while not ignored, is much less precisely specified.
The natural question that then arises is whether the Kyoto Protocol is to be considered as just an "Annex I" Protocol; or is it to be seen, after further thought and beyond the appearances, as a worldwide Protocol? Below, we defend the second thesis, first on the basis of our own conviction, but also because we think we can support it by means of well established conceptual tools of economics and game theory. 6 For a thorough account of the scientific evidence on the state of the problem, the reader is referred to the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and in particular to the contribution of its Working Group III (see under IPCC 1995 in our references below). 7 178 in Rio, 159 in Kyoto and 161 in Buenos Aires. 8 "Annex 1" (to the Rio Convention text) countries are the OECD countries, those of the former Soviet Union and those of the eastern European economies in transition.
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For the applied economist, the Kyoto Protocol offers an exceptionally rich combination of opportunities to put theory into use, both in a positive and a normative way -that is, for explaining events as well as for advising on decision making. Indeed, several strands of theory are involved as we shall show: externalities of the Samuelsonian public good type, Nash n o n cooperative equilibria, worldwide Pareto optimality, cooperative solution concepts, and finally Walrasian market equilibria with their Edgeworthian coalitional stability... . All these are involved!
Main features of the Protocol
We briefly state here what the main features of the Protocol are, from the point of view of our arguments to follow:
(i) Dated emission quotas, expressed in percentages of 1990 emissions, are established for Annex I countries, to be met around 2010.
(ii) The principles of (a) emissions trading by countries (or by their nationals) and of (b) joint implementation are established for Annex I countries.
(iii) A clean development mechanism (CDM) is established as a way to involve non Annex-1 countries (especially developing ones) in some particular form of joint implementation and emissions trading.
No explicit provision in the Protocol mentions the introduction of targets for non Annex-1 countries. But it is expected that this will take place in the future through the general review clauses of the Protocol and of the Convention.
Trade in emissions will be allowed only among countries who do ratify.
It is also expected that it will not be allowed with the countries that would not fulfill their obligations under the Protocol.
Finally, the Protocol comes automatically into force 9 only if (i) at least 55 Parties to the Convention have ratified it, and (ii) these 55 Parties include a number of Annex 1 Parties accounting for at least 55% of the base year CO 2 emissions of all Annex I Parties to the Convention.
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While parties are committing themselves to proceed to enforcement within their country, no sanctions are specified if a ratifying country does not fulfill its obligations under the Protocol, except for the above provision on being excluded from emissions trading. A compliance regime, including possible sanctions for non-compliance, is yet to be specified in the process of future negotiations.
Economics of the issues at stake
Consider the n countries of the world (indexed below i = 1, ...,n), who each enjoy an aggregate consumption level x i , equal to the aggregate value of their production activities y i , minus the damage D i consisting in lost production that results from global pollution. Each country i's productive activity entails indeed some amount of polluting emissions e i , that are related with production according to the increasing and strictly concave production function 10 y i = g i (e i ). Damages in each country are generated by the total of such emissions, Σ i =1 n e i ; they affect production possibilities in each country 11 in a way that is usually represented by an increasing damage cost
n e j ) that for simplicity we assume to be linear. Each country's consumption possibilities are thus given by the expression
where d i > 0 is thus the damage cost per unit of emission or, equivalently, the benefit per unit of abatement (for decreasing Σ e j ).
World optimality
Ignoring distributional issues, world consumption optimality can then be represented by the consumption levels that maximize Σ 
We shall develop our arguments below under the assumption that climate change negotiations are aiming at achieving such a world optimum.
Attaining it requires coordination among the countries, so as to ensure that each one of them does take into account the effect of its emissions on the other countries as reflected by their damage cost functions.
Non cooperative equilibrium
It is indeed often argued 12 that in the absence of coordination countries choose emission policies that best suit their own interest, taking as given what the other countries do. This leads to consider that a non cooperative equilibrium of some sort prevails between countries if no negotiations take place.
How would a country determine its best emissions levels? The answer is not immediate since imposing to itself low emissions implies low net production according to the function g i , whereas allowing for high emissions entails high damage costs according to the function D i . Classical economic reasoning suggests that a rational domestic optimum for each country would be one that best balances these two aspects; it is achieved by maximizing its own consumption level x i with respect to e i as defined in (1), taking as given all variables e j with j ≠ i. If all countries adopt such a behavior, a Nash-type equilibrium between countries prevails, that we represent by the vector of emissions 13 ( e 1 ,..., e n ). For each country i, the first order condition of its maximizing behavior is given by the equation
while its achievable consumption level is
12 see e.g. CHANDER and TULKENS 1992 13 Uniqueness of this vector is ensured under our assumptions of concavity of the functions g i and of linearity of the functions D i .
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Two characteristics of the non cooperative equilibrium so defined are essential for our purposes: (i) the equilibrium emissions ( e 1 ,..., e n ) are clearly not a world optimum as can be seen from comparing (2) 
Coalitional stability for the treaty
The basic reason for the non optimality of the Nash Equilibrium is a well known externality argument. Each country decides its emission level e i without concern for the effects on other countries: it thus equates its marginal abatement cost, g' i (e i ), to its own marginal damage cost, d i , whereas a world optimum requires each country to equate its marginal abatement cost to the aggregate world marginal damage cost,
Furthermore, a world optimum may require from the various countries different levels of abatement e i − e i * , entailing costs and benefits that are a priori by no means identical across them: some may have high abatement costs while having only small damage costs to avoid, whereas other countries may have low abatement costs while facing high damage costs. To have the world optimum voluntarily agreed upon by all countries requires in addition that for each country and for each group of countries the benefits exceed the costs of abatement. Because of the asymmetries just mentioned, this can be achieved only by means of appropriately designed resource transfers from the net gainers to the net losers.
To that effect CHANDER and TULKENS 1997 have proposed that the optimal emission levels (e 1 * , ... , e n * ) specified in the treaty be accompanied by a scheme of transfers ( T 1 ,...,T n ) which are of the form:
where T i > 0 if the transfer is received by country i, while T i < 0 if the transfer is paid 14 . The first expression within braces is equal to the abatement 8 cost borne by country i from moving from its Nash equilibrium level of emissions e i to the level e i * prescribed by world optimality. As this amount is positive in (4), the rôle of this part of the transfer appears to be to cover that cost increase for i. The second expression within braces is the world total over all countries of their emissions abatement cost from the Nash equilibrium levels to the world optimal ones-also a positive magnitude.
n d j and taking account of the negative sign, the second term in (4) thus determines a contribution of country i, which is specified as a fraction of the aggregate abatement cost.
Clearly Σ i =1 n T i = 0, so that these transfers would ensure a balanced budget if an international agency were established for implementing them. Notice also the role played by the reference emission levels e i in the design of the transfers -a feature whose importance will be highlighted below.
The "coalitional stability" property claimed above for the ChanderTulkens proposal of optimality with transfers is that, in addition to making each country individually better off compared to the Nash equilibrium, it also makes every group of countries better off, compared to what they could get by adopting any alternative arrangement among themselves, be it i n terms of emissions, or transfers, or both. For further reference in our arguments below, let us be more precise on this property. Let W = {i = 1, ... , n} denote the set of all countries of the world and S ⊂ W be any subset, or "coalition" of countries. Then the best outcome that the members of S could obtain by making arrangements among themselves only -to be called a "partial agreement Nash equilibrium with respect to S" (PANE w.r.t. S) -is the one resulting from the emissions policy (ẽ 1 ,...,ẽ n ) defined by, for the members of S,
and for the countries not in S:
A PANE w.r.t. S is thus a Nash equilibrium between the countries in S acting jointly and the remaining countries acting individually. It can be characterized by the first-order conditions: Moreover, since total world emissions are lower in a PANE w.r.t. S, the countries outside the coalition are better off, although that is not the intention of the coalition.
4 Statics vs. dynamics
Thus far, and for most of the sequel, the above quantities x i and e i are considered to be flows per unit of time. The damages from climate change are however induced less by the flow of greenhouse gas emissions than by the increase 16 ∆S in their accumulated stock S in the atmosphere. At each time t, ∆S t is thus determined by a relation of the form
where according to climatic science common wisdom δ ≅ 0.01 and k is of the order of .5 (and slowly increasing over time). While this more elaborate modeling has its merits, it turns out to be unnecessary for our purposes. Indeed, one may have noted that the specific object of the Kyoto Protocol is not trajectories of emissions: it is emissions levels at some point in time (around 17 2010). We therefore feel justified i n working, in the present paper, with the usual "static" or one period model 18 .
"No regrets", "business-as-usual" and other possible domestic non cooperative policies at the pre-agreement stage
The non cooperative behavior described in section 3.2 is not the only one conceivable of this kind. Indeed, the fulfillment of conditions (3) that characterize it requires domestic policies to be designed and implemented, involving an energy tax or appropriately priced pollution permits, so that the energy price including the tax or the permits unit price be equal to the domestic marginal damage cost d i . These belong to the class of what is often called "no regret policies". However, not all countries can be said to have adopted such a nationally rational course of action.
For instance, industrial firms in some countries may have strong lobbying power and use it so as to obtain low energy prices. While still choosing, as profit maximizers, energy use and emissions so that ′ g i be equal to the price of energy (denoted henceforth as p i ), this results into emissions e i higher than e i and such that g' i (e i ) < d i , thus successfully preventing the nationally rational policy to be adopted. If this behavior is assumed to prevail in all countries, a different equilibrium -equally non cooperative -results, called by NORDHAUS and YANG 1996 the "market solution"
("business-as-usual", according to others). Alternatively, energy importing countries facing balance of payments problems may have introduced high taxes and domestic prices of energy: their emission levels e i are then likely to be such that g' i (e i ) > d i .
Finally, another reason why a nationally rational policy may not come about is that firms in a country may simply not be profit maximizers, as it is particularly the case with large public sector enterprises of non market economies. In such cases, the domestic equilibria are neither of the "market" nor of the "nationally rational" type, and energy prices do not induce any well defined emissions policy -except for the fact of a generally low concern for economical use of energy.
Our point in this section is that in the situation prevailing at the prenegotiation stage, all three types of country behavior are likely to be present, and we wish to illustrate this empirically with the data in Table 1 below.
We first note a similarity between the structure, across some major countries, of the average energy prices for three kinds of fossil fuels (first three columns) on the one hand, and of the marginal abatement costs (fourth column) on the other hand. In particular, it is seen that the energy prices in the US are systematically lower and so is the marginal cost of abatement 19 . Moreover, for the three developed regions US, EU and Japan which are also market economies, the higher the energy prices, the higher the marginal abatement costs 20 . For the other countries we cannot say much, not only because of lack of data but also because they are either non market or less developed, or both.
Second, we have an opportunity to characterize some domestic policies by using equation (3) -according to which in countries that choose their emission levels rationally, i.e. in the "no regrets sense", the marginal damage cost from emissions must be equal to the marginal abatement cost and also to the average energy prices. Indeed, the data in the table reveal that marginal abatement costs are lower in the US compared to the EU and Japan (they are even lower than those of a developing country like India). Now, it can hardly be the case that the marginal damage cost for the US, the largest economy, be lower than that of the EU or of Japan. Therefore, we have an indication that in the US, decisions regarding emissions are determined by the "business-as-usual" policy rather than optimized at the national level.
We indicate in the last column the type of pre-negotiation domestic equilibrium we conjecture from the data to prevail in each region . 19 In case of Japan, the marginal cost of abatement may look exceptionally high, but this is because of its large dependence on nuclear energy and natural gas. 20 Coal in Japan is a noticeable exception; but its use there is considerably lower.
What is the relevance of these observations for our purposes in this paper? While the optimum emissions (e 1 * , ... , e n * ) are, as seen from (2), independent of those at the pre-negotiation stage, the transfers T i defined i n (4) may have to be modified with the e i 's substituted by the actual emission levels of each country i as they are described here. Does such a substitution affect the coalitional stability property of the transfers? The answer is n o 21 , as long as one can assume that coutries do adopt the same behavior at the preagreement stage and at a PANE when not in the colaition. For the sake of simplicity however, we will continue to consider the e i 's as Nash equilibrium emission levels. Thirdly, the reference emission levels e i -that play a rôle in the design of the transfers (4) ensuring coalitional stability -may themselves be considered unfair, typically by those countries that are in the early stages of their economic development: they currently have comparatively low emission levels, while developed countries have high ones. In the future, when they will be developed, currently developing countries will have higher emissions and they might argue that these should be used as reference levels instead of those of today.
Finally, if reductions in emissions e i -e i * , are very large (as proposed by some countries), they are simply not politically feasible, at least in the short run. In fact, the Kyoto Protocol only requires relatively small reductions for the immediate future (the next fifteen years), leaving further reductions for later periods.
For all these reasons it is difficult to assess whether the emissions reductions chosen by the Kyoto signatories correspond to world optimal emissions. 
Efficiency of emissions trading
If the Kyoto aggregate emissions reduction to ê is achieved by letting each country abide to its emissions quota and simply emit up to e i = ê i , the ensuing aggregate gross world production, ŷ = 
How are these efficient emission levels to be determined? With appropriate information on the production (or abatement cost) functions g i , this could be done by computation. However, having argued above that such information is hard to come by, it is likely that strong opposition would arise against the computed emission levels, and in particular against those that would be larger than ê i , which is indeed a possibility! We want to show presently that the desired efficient emission levels are precisely those that a competitive market equilibrium in tradable emission quotas would determine; in other words, that tradability of quotas automatically solves the problem (5)-(6).
To this effect, notice first that the vector ê*= (ê 1 * ,...,ê n * ) we are interested in identically solves the problem of maximizing aggregate gross production:
because the dropped terms d i Σ j =1 nê j are constants in (5).
Next, define a competitive emissions trading equilibrium with respect to (ê 1 ,...,ê n ) as a vector of national emissions (ê' 1 ,. ..,ê' n ) and a price γ > 0 for CO 2 (expressed in units of consumption goods per unit of CO 2 emission) such that for each country i = 1, ... , n,
and
In such a competitive emissions trading equilibrium, the countries (typically their firms, but conceivably also other economic agents) freely trade in their pollution rights, equal to their emissions quotas (ê 1 ,...,ê n ), at the given pricê γ , and at that price, demand and supply of pollution rights are equal 23 . The magnitudes γ (ê i −ˆ′ e i ) represent the value, in private goods, of payments for the purchase, at world price γ , of quotas if (ê i −ˆ′ e i ), the amount purchased, is negative, or of receipts from the sale of quotas if (ê i −ˆ′ e i ), the amount sold, is positive.
Clearly the vector (ê' 1 ,...ê' n ) defined by (8)- (9) is also the one that solves (7), hence (5)- (6) and thereby maximizes world consumption, since
As a confirmation, it can be seen from the first order condition for (8) that at the price γ the equality g i (ê i ')=γ is satisfied for all i's, implying that g i (ê i ')= g j (ê j ') for all i, j = 1, ... , n, a necessary condition for a solution of (5)- (6). 23 Existence and uniqueness of a competitive emissions trading equilibrium follow from concavity of the functions g i and continuity arguments.
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Trading thus allows countries to achieve the aggregate emissions reduction ê with the highest level of world consumption compatible with this reduction or, in other words, at the lowest opportunity cost for the world. This holds even if for some countries (ê i −ˆ′ e i ) is negative: the point is indeed that world consumption be maximized and not that all countries necessarily emit ˆ′ e i lower than ê i .
Coalitional stability of competitive trading
If 
that is, is the maximum total gross 24 output that the countries in the block S can hope to jointly achieve given their aggregate emissions constraint.
Consider now again (ê' 1 ,...ê' n ) , the world competitive emissions trading equilibrium with respect to (ê 1 ,...,ê n ). If we can show that the members of S are better off at that worldwide competitive equilibrium than at their best actions as a separate block (as identified in (10)), we shall have established that block S has no interest to form, thus answering in the negative the question raised in this section. This is in fact straightforward. Indeed, with our notation it amounts to show that
that is, using (8), that
where (ẽ i ) i∈S is the solution to (10). Clearly, we have Σ i∈Sêi = Σ i∈Sẽi . Hence we must show that
But this inequality is true since from concavity of g i we have for each i in S
using the fact that γ = ′ g i (ˆ′ e i ) at the world competitive emissions trading equilibrium 25 .
Repeating this argument for any conceivable block of countries leads to the conclusion that no block has an interest to form 26 , once a competitive emissions trading equilibrium prevails at the world level.
We have thus shown that the outcome of competitive trade i n emissions among the countries cannot be improved upon by the formation of coalitions of countries, such as e.g. trading blocks. We are thereby rediscovering -in fact, just applying -a general property of market equilibria known as their "core" property, which says that such equilibria belong to the core of some appropriately formulated cooperative game 27 . 25 and irrespective of whether (ẽ i −ê' i ) is positive or negative.
26 Not only no block S taken in the aggregate, as formulated in (11), but also each member of the block, as (12) shows 27 In technical game theoretical terms, the expression v(S) defined above is the payoff that S can achieve for its members and any vector (e i ) i∈S that meets the condition e i i∈S ∑ =ê i i∈S ∑ is an emissions strategy for S. Then the pair [W, v ] satisfies the definition of a n-person game in characteristic function form where v is the function v : 2 W → ℜ defined by (10). A strategy for the grand coalition W , (e i ) i∈W , is said to be in the core of this game if for each S ⊂ W , Σ i∈S g i (e i ) ≥ v(S). That there exists such a strategy, that is, that the core of our game is non empty can be asserted in general terms by showing that the game is balanced (in the sense of SHAPLEY 1967). But we provide above the same positive answer in an economically more interesting way by exhibiting an actual strategy for W -namely the equilibrium outcome of worldwide competitive emissions trading -that we show to belong to the core. Notice t h a t the cooperative game defined here (and hence its core) is not the same as the one proposed in TULKENS 1995,1997 . The present game is a pure market game where externalities play no rôle since, once the quotas are fixed, the public good aspect of t h e problem disappears. One is left with only the private goods-type problem of allocating t h e emissions between the countries. It is worth pointing out, finally, that the game is one for an economy with production, and not of the usual pure exchange type.
Desirability of worldwide and competitive trading
While the Kyoto Protocol can be seen as allowing for trading i n emissions among the Annex 1 or more parties, it leaves open the questions of the extent and nature of such trading 28 . Economic and game theoretic considerations can be further called upon to resolve these questions.
As to the extent of trading, that is, the number of participants in the trade, market equilibrium theory makes a case in favor of emissions trading with the largest number of traders possible. Thus, worldwide emissions trading is desirable. This is implied by the previous argument on subgroups, be they trading blocks or any other form of "coalitions". Indeed, if it is not to the benefit of any such subgroup of countries to form and act independently of the other countries, the outcome is also not more beneficial for these other countries, if a subgroup were to form This is because their only best actions would be to act also as a subgroup, and for this subgroup the inequality (11) also applies.
We claim on that basis that it is in the world's overall economic interest that non Annex 1 countries, whose emissions are not subject to quotas, be nevertheless allowed to participate in the trading process. The clean development mechanism (CDM) contains provisions to that effect. A policy implication of our claim is that this mechanism be designed so as to make it as open as possible to the largest number of countries. The fact that no quotas was assigned to many countries is irrelevant to the beneficial property, both for the world in general and for those countries in particular, of a worldwide emissions trading equilibrium.
As to the nature of trading, the same body of theory advocates that the institutions governing the trades be designed so as to ensure that they be as competitive as possible -competitiveness meaning here that all participants behave as price takers. It is indeed only for markets with that property that efficiency, coalitional stability and worldwide maximal benefits are established.
Regulatory provisions that would result in restricting competitiveness in the emissions trading process are thus to be avoided, just as well as the absence of regulations designed to prevent restrictions to competition. Such are, for instance, provisions allowing for market power to be exerted by some 28 To be addressed at the Conference of Parties in Buenos Aires in November 1998. traders so as to influence price formation to their advantage, as well as regulatory controls that would impede sufficient price flexibility; or still, as proposed by some, the capping of the quantities that participants are allowed to trade on.
As is well known, the larger the number of participants, the more competitive the market is likely to be: our argument favoring a large extent of the market is thus also one that favors competition 29 . Large numbers are admittedly neither the only way nor a sufficient condition to ensure the competitive character of a market, but they are a powerful factor.
A numerical illustration
Using the carbon emissions reduction commitments made by the Annex 1 parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the marginal cost abatement curves generated by MIT's EPPA model (which is a multi-regional, multi- Table 2 ) Ellerman and Decaux's estimate of the world competitive emissions trading equilibrium in 2010 and of its price γ at that time which is US$/ton 24.75.
Beyond the Kyoto quotas: towards a world coalitionally stable optimum
The outcome of the competitive emissions trading equilibrium with respect to the Kyoto quotas (ê 1 ,...,ê n ) is described in the last row of Table 2 . It is seen that it results into monetary transfers among the countries and equalizes their marginal costs of abatement. This equilibrium thus very much looks like the worldwide treaty described above (Chander and Tulkens 1997) which also requires transfers among the countries and equalizes their marginal costs of abatement (see (2) and (4) (8)- (9). And the right hand side is precisely the Chander and Tulkens transfer T i advocated in Section 3 (see (4)) above to achieve optimality in a coalitionally stable way.
Notice that while the world optimum emissions (e 1 * ,..., e n * ) as defined i n (2) are independent of the reference emission levels (e 1 ,...,e n ) as defined i n (3), the emission quotas (ê 1 * ,...,ê n * ) as defined in (13) are not. In fact, since the optimal emissions are independent of reference emissions, there is a one-toone correspondence between (ê 1 * ,...,ê n * ) and (e 1 ,...,e n ). This means that if the reference emission levels (e 1 ,...,e n ) are not in dispute, then the emission quotas (ê 1 * ,...,ê n * ) along with competitive emissions trading would also be acceptable to all countries since by definition these would not only lead to the optimum emissions (e 1 * ,..., e n * ) but also to transfers that would make each country or group of countries better-off compared to (e 1 ,...,e n ).
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The significance of this shift in perspective lies in the fact that, as noted earlier, the currently considered reference emission levels (e 1 ,...,e n ) are felt to be unfair, typically by the countries that are in the early steps of economic development with comparatively low emission levels. Therefore, the emissions of such countries may not be subjected to quotas, as agreed upon at Kyoto, at least until the time when their emission levels become comparable to those of Annex 1 countries. With time their emissions will rise as a result of economic development and those of the Annex 1 countries will fall as a result of abatement. While the Kyoto Protocol is a step in the right direction in terms of the actual emissions, we are suggesting here that the effective ultimate aim should in fact be to reach an agreement o n appropriate reference emission levels (or pollution rights) (e 1 ,...,e n ) at some future round of negotiations.
The discussion in the preceding paragraph clarifies that once an agreement is reached regarding reference emissions (e 1 ,...,e n ) then an agreement would also be reached regarding the target emission quotas (ê 1 * ,...,ê n * ) and competitive emissions trading which by definition lead to optimum emissions (e 1 * ,..., e n * ) and transfers that ensure coalitional stability.
Such an agreement requires the countries first to agree on equity principles to be adopted, as for instance per capita or per unit of GDP emissions. The currently considered baselines of business-as-usual Nash equilibrium or historically grandfathered emissions are known to be problematic. Something else seems to be required, making explicit room, for instance, to principles like the one of "common but differentiated responsibilities". If such new reference levels can be agreed upon, our analysis suggests that a quotas and trading scheme of the kind pioneered i n Kyoto is an appropriate tool to reach stable world optimality in the future. (762.79) . This is equivalent to giving credit for emission reductions that would happen in any case.
